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Personal social networking sites (SNS) are popular outlets for people to share information
about themselves, their family and friends, and their personal and professional lives. On
the surface, the information shared may seem to be innocuous or nonthreatening.
However, prior studies have shown that cybercriminals can take information shared via
personal SNS and use it to conduct attacks against organizations. Organization
executives are of particular interest to cybercriminals because they have access to
sensitive data, and they also have the ability to command actions from their subordinates.
The purpose of this study was to explore what executive personal SNS behaviors pose
financial risks to an organization.
This study utilized grounded theory method (GTM) to interview nine information
security professionals to discover their perceptions regarding executives’ personal SNS
behaviors that could pose a financial risk to an organization. The researcher used a semistructured interview process in order to collect thick, rich data for analysis. Respondents
came from a diverse array of industries, thus providing data from multiple perspectives.
The resulting data analysis revealed four overarching dimensions: Loss of Intellectual
Property or Sensitive Data; Compliance Violations; Harm to Reputation, and Fraudulent
Transaction Loss. These overarching dimensions were supported by multiple themes,
which were built on concepts identified from respondent interview data. These
overarching dimensions were used to build an emergent theoretical model to explain what
personal executive SNS behaviors pose financial risks to an organization.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Cybercriminals direct social engineering attacks at organizational employees as a
means to secure access to sensitive data (Conteh & Royer, 2016; Gardner & Thomas,
2014; Greitzer et al., 2014; Wilcox, Bhattacharya, & Islam, 2014). Adversaries collect
and use intelligence to engage in organizational attacks through various vectors. For
example, cybercriminals use pretexting, a form of social engineering (SE), to create
scenarios that convince victims to perform the desired action (Brody, Brizzee, & Cano,
2012; Greitzer, et al., 2014; Luo, Brody, Seazzu, & Burd, 2011). Cybercriminals can
employ pretexting in many attack vectors, including phishing (Conteh & Royer, 2016;
Symantec, 2015; Verizon Enterprises, 2016), spear phishing (He, 2012; Heartfield &
Loukas, 2015; Laszka, Lou, & Vorobeychik, 2015; Teplinsky, 2013), vishing via
telephone, voice over IP (VoIP), or short message service (SMS) messages (Gardner &
Thomas, 2014; Shahriar, Klintic, & Clincy, 2015).
Frequently, cybercriminals collect data used in these attacks through personal social
media channels which belong to an employee, such as community-based platforms
(Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), discussion boards, blogs, and wikis (Greitzer, et al., 2014;
He, 2012; Kim, 2012). Collectively, these channels are called social network sites, or
SNS (boyd & Ellison, 2007). Data collected about an employee via SNS may seem
harmless to an organization. However, like Humphreys, Gill, and Krishnamurthy (2014,
p. 846) noted, when aggregated, this type of data "…may tell a deeper, more intimate
1

story" about an individual.
Data gathered from SNS users can be used to design SE attacks (Constantiou &
Kalinikos, 2015; Palmer, 2020; Social-Engineer LLC, 2019). SNS users share personal
information for various reasons, such as developing or maintaining personal relationships
or general knowledge acquisition (Krasnova, Veltri, Eling, & Buxmann, 2017; Wakefield
& Wakefield, 2016), as well as perceived benefits to job performance (Ali-Hassan, Nevo,
& Wade, 2015). Such data, collected from employees’ personal SNS, helps
cybercriminals to design realistic pretexting scenarios (Greitzer, et al., 2014; He, 2012;
Kim, 2012).
Once cybercriminals collect SNS data, they next look to use it for SE attacks against
organizations (Greitzer, et al., 2014). Email account compromise (EAC) is one such type
of SE attack. With an EAC attack, cybercriminals can use SNS data to hijack or
impersonate executives’ accounts and use the authority of the executives’ position to
direct employees to initiate an EFT or wire transfer to a bank account that they control
(Burch, Taylor, & Yeung, 2015; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017; Kemp, 2016).
Upon receipt of the funds, the cybercriminal then disperses the funds to other accounts,
for obfuscation and making recovery of those funds for the victim organization difficult,
if not impossible (Burch, et al., 2015; Meinert, 2016).
Organization executives are frequent targets of EACs because of their access to
sensitive data, as well as their ability to command actions from subordinates (Bullée,
Montoya, Pieters, Junger, & Hartel, 2017; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017; Sharp,
2017; Trustwave, 2017). Executives make these attacks easier for cybercriminals by
sharing data on SNS (Burch, et al., 2015). Such breaches put organizations at risk in
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three primary areas: monetary losses, corporate liability, and credibility (Cavusoglu,
Cavusoglu, & Raghunathan, 2004). Kemp (2016) noted a 270% increase in this type of
attack since January 2015, with an estimated loss of 2.3 billion dollars in 2014-2015. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) reported a 2,370% increase in identified losses
between January 2015 and December 2016, with instances occurring in each of the 50
states in the United States of America, as well as 131 countries. As these numbers
demonstrate, successful attacks can have a direct impact on the organization's financial
well-being, ranging from inconvenient to catastrophic.
Categorizing the types of data being accessed by cybercriminals to engage in EAC
attacks has proven to be difficult, due to the lack of a seminal definition. For example,
the literature shows that there is a tendency to use the phrase personally identifiable
information (PII) interchangeably with personal information (PI) and sensitive
information (SI) (Baker & Hostetler LLP, 2017; Humphreys, et al., 2014; Peppet, 2014;
Schwartz & Solove, 2014) to describe essentially the same data points. Social data is
data collected from social media platforms (Constantiou & Kalinikos, 2015; Krombholz,
Hobel, Huber, & Weippl, 2015; Mukkamala, Vatrapu, & Hussain, 2013). This study will
use the term social data to describe the data shared by organization executives via their
personal SNS.
Problem Statement
Executives’ use of personal SNS makes organizations more vulnerable to attacks. In
one such attack which took place for several months in 2018, a group of cybercriminals
known as London Blue developed a list of over 50,000 finance executives to target
(AGARI Data, 2018). Of those potential targets, 71% carried the title of Chief Financial
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Officer (CFO) (AGARI Data, 2018). In March 2018, Pathe Cinemas lost more than 19
million euros after cybercriminals targeted both their CFO and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) for attack (Grooten, 2018). After being fired by Pathe Cinemas, the CFO
successfully sued his former employer for back wages for improper termination, resulting
in an even more significant loss for the organization (Grooten, 2018). In December 2018,
the "Save the Children" charity organization disclosed they lost $1 million as the result of
a business email compromise (BEC) attack (Wallack, 2018). Industry professionals have
made calls for corporate security teams to help senior executives improve their cyber
hygiene because they unknowingly leak information via SNS and other means (Grunwitz,
2018).
Extant literature sheds little light on the financial risks organizations face from their
executives’ personal use of SNS. Studies have explored the general need for social
engineering training in the organizational context (Buckley, Nurse, Legg, Goldsmith, &
Creese, 2014; Molok, Chang, & Ahmad, 2013), as well as the effectiveness of social
engineering awareness training in general (Gardner & Thomas, 2014; Korpela, 2015;
Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016). Also, existing literature has examined organizational
issues associated with the surveillance of personal SNS (Uldam, 2016). Furthermore,
existing literature has explored steps organizations can take to minimize the potential
damage from social engineering attacks in general (Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Vaast
& Kaganer, 2013), as well as to understand the legalities surrounding organizational
policies regarding employees use of their personal social media channels in non-work
related situations (Sánchez Abril, Levin, & Del Riego, 2012). To date, there has not been
a systematic study that ties social engineering, organizational information security risk
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assessment, and information security policies to better, more secure use of personal SNS
by organizational executives. The first step in that direction is understanding what
executive SNS behaviors place organizations at risk.
Dissertation Goal
The goal of this research study was to explore the types of executive SNS behaviors
that might pose a financial risk to an organization.
Research Question
This study answered the following research question:
RQ1: What executive personal SNS behaviors pose financial risks to an
organization?
Relevance and Significance
This study advanced current research by gaining a deeper understanding of what
executives' behaviors on SNS can post financial risks to an organization. Organizations
continue to be susceptible to attacks via the human element (Social-Engineer LLC, 2017).
Documented incidents involving senior organizational management are plentiful (Atkins
& Huang, 2013; Rivera, 2018). Existing literature has explored the risks organizations
face by way of their executives, as well as the roles they can play in helping to mitigate
those risks (Brody, et al., 2012; Bronk, 2014; Buckley, et al., 2014; Burch, et al., 2015;
Hsu, Shih, Hung, & Lowry, 2015). This study helped inform academia as well as
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practitioners by offering an emergent theoretical model that explores the financial risks
organizations face from executives’ use of their personal SNS.
Barriers and Issues
One barrier for this study was getting Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval to
interview study respondents. Since this research involved collecting potentially sensitive
or embarrassing information, the researcher had to develop trust with respondents,
demonstrate data safekeeping processes, and how the data collected would not put the
respondent or the researcher at risk (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Another potential
barrier to the study was the population size needed to complete the study. As Creswell
and Creswell (2018) noted, researchers must purposefully choose respondents for
qualitative studies in order to help the researcher understand both the problem and the
research question.
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations
Assumptions
The study has some assumptions. One assumption is that that all respondents
answered questions truthfully and honestly. Another assumption is that respondents
chosen to participate are representative of the overall population. Yet another assumption
is that the respondents possessed the necessary insight to provide valid responses.
Limitations
The study has some limitations. One limitation is the availability of respondents for
recorded interviews. To counter this limitation, the researcher was very flexible in
scheduling interviews both in place and time. Most interviews were done remotely via
WebEx, but the researcher also traveled to conduct one interview in-person. Another
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limitation is the dearth of extant research available about organization executives’ use of
SMS.
Delimitations
The study has some delimitations. One delimitation is that all respondents came from
the United States. As a result, conducting the same study in a different country could
yield different findings. A second delimitation is the work experience level of the
respondents. By requiring a minimum of five years of work experience, the study does
not include data from respondents who may have valid insights but fail to meet the
minimum experience threshold.
Definition of Terms
Email Account Compromise (EAC) – A form of social engineering attack which
targets employees who are authorized to perform EFT or wire transfer payments (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2017)
Information security – A well-informed sense of assurance that information risks and
technical, formal and informal controls are in dynamic balance (Torres, Sarriegi, Santos,
& Serrano, 2006)
Pretexting – A form of social engineering involving the creation of scenarios
designed to convince the victim to perform the desired action (Brody, et al., 2012;
Greitzer, et al., 2014; Luo, et al., 2011)
Risk – the possibility of an undesired outcome which results from an incident or
occurrence, as determined by the likelihood and relevant consequences (Department of
Homeland Security Risk Steering Committee, 2010)

7

Social data - data which has collected from social media platforms (Constantiou &
Kalinikos, 2015; Krombholz, et al., 2015; Mukkamala, et al., 2013)
Social engineering (SE) – deceptive practices designed to entice individuals to aid
attackers in achieving their goals (Atkins & Huang, 2013)
Social network site(s) (SNS) – Web-based services that allow users to build a public
or semi-public profile within a bounded system; create a list of other users they share a
connection with; view their list as well as others (boyd & Ellison, 2007)
List of Acronyms
BEC – Business email compromise
CEO – Chief executive officer
CFO – Chief financial officer
EAC – Email account compromise
IS – Information systems
PI – Personal information
PII – Personally identifiable information
SE – Social engineering
SI – Sensitive information
SNS – Social network site(s)
Summary
This chapter discussed the background for the research topic, describing various
information security threats to the organization, and how executive behaviors can pose a
financial risk to the organization. This chapter also laid out the foundation for the
justification of the proposed study and described the research question to be studied.
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Additionally, the relevance and significance of the study were discussed, as well as
barriers and issues, which may affect the study. Finally, definitions for specific terms
used in the study were defined.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Introduction
This section will explore literature specific to information security as a defined
concept, ways to classify organizations, organization executives, and how they differ
from rank-and-file employees, organizational information disclosure, and organizational
risk. The literature search focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the Association for
Information Systems (AIS) Senior Scholars’ Basket of Journals list (Association for
Information Systems, 2011). The literature review supports the researcher’s position that
a gap in the literature exists at the intersection of executive SNS behaviors and the
potential financial risks they pose to an organization.
Information Security definition
Based on a review of the literature, the term information security, while frequently
used, lacks a seminal definition or explanation. Existing literature observed that the term
is a concept that lacks a clear-cut definition (Anderson, 2003; Torres, et al., 2006).
Dlamini, Eloff, and Eloff (2009) found that the concept of information security predates
the invention of the computer. Interestingly, there are numerous articles (Crossler et al.,
2013; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; Lowry, Posey, Bennett, & Roberts, 2015;
Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016) which use the term information security without ever
supplying a definition, thus leaving it to the reader to interpret its meaning through their
lenses and experiences.
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Anderson (2003) observed that previous attempts to define information security were
overly broad. Subsequently, Anderson (2003, p. 310) offered his definition of
information security as being "…A well-informed sense of assurance that information
risks and controls are in balance". Torres, et al. (2006, p. 532) offered a definition similar
to that offered by Anderson (2003), "Information security is a well-informed sense of
assurance that information risks and technical, formal and informal controls are in
dynamic balance."
Further complicating the issue of defining information security is the increasing use
of the terms cybersecurity or cyber security. Agresti (2010) and von Solms and van
Niekerk (2013) both noted that these terms might be viewed by some as having the same
meaning, thus making their usage interchangeable. Agresti (2010) also went on to note
that the use of the term cybersecurity is increasingly replacing information security as the
default term. Bronk (2014) observed that the term cyber security could have different
meanings to different market sectors, as well as to nation-states when considering
national defense concerns. von Solms and van Niekerk (2013) explored the differences
between the terms information security and cyber security/cybersecurity, concluded there
is a difference between the terms, and thus not interchangeable. Similar to the
observation made previously, numerous articles used the term cybersecurity or cyber
security without defining it (Carlton & Levy, 2015). This study will use the definition of
information security as offered by Torres, et al. (2006). By extension, we will define an
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information security risk as any activity that could potentially disrupt the aforementioned
dynamic balance.
Social Networking Sites (SNS)
Existing literature has explored several different themes related to SNS. This section
will cover some of those themes, including challenges and benefits of enterprise SNS
usage; benefits of SNS data available to organizations; personal risks associated with
information shared via SNS; emotional benefits and challenges associated with SNS;
SNS privacy policy impact on users’ willingness to share personal information; and
employee benefits from using SNS.
Leonardi (2015) examined the benefits of organizationally restricted SNS, focusing
on the benefits of ambient knowledge gained by employee SNS interaction. According to
Leonardi (2015), employees using SNS to interact internally can gain a degree of ambient
awareness, which he described as an understanding of who knows what (also described as
organizational metaknowledge) within an organization. Choudrie and Zamani (2016)
explored the challenges of organizationally restricted SNS use within the workplace.
Choudrie and Zamani (2016) found that the implantation of SNS software in the
workplace can be challenging. In order to benefit from SNS software usage, the
organization must take the proper steps to highlight the benefits associated with its usage
(Choudrie & Zamani, 2016). Forsgren and Byström (2017) explored the benefits
associated with organizationally restricted SNS usage by conducting a case study of a
Scandinavian software company. By exploring the environment through the lens of
activity theory, Forsgren and Byström (2017) discovered that SNS usage within the
organization made work-related activities more coherent, even in environments where the
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SNS was not optimized.
Pike, Bateman, and Butler (2017) explored how organizations use information from
external SNS to assist in the hiring process of job candidates. Pike, et al. (2017) found
that while information collected on job candidates via SNS can be beneficial, hiring
managers must be careful to evaluate the quality of the information collected holistically.
Specifically, information collected from sources which evidenced a high degree of
context collapse may increase the amount of ambiguity in the decision-making process,
as opposed to reducing it.
Wakefield (2013) examined how user affect impacted the desire to disclose
information online. Wakefield (2013) found that when users had a pleasant experience
using a website, privacy concerns decreased, and their perception of trust increased. As a
result of the pleasant experience, users were more likely to share personal information
with the website (Wakefield, 2013). Chen, Lu, Chau, and Gupta (2014), as well as
Heravi, Mubarak, and Choo (2018) explored how personal risks associated with
information shared via SNS help shape user intent to use SNS. Both Chen, et al. (2014)
and Heravi, et al. (2018) confirmed that perceived cyber risks from sharing information
played a critical role in user determination about SNS usage. Hu, Kettinger, and Poston
(2015) examined the role that perceived information risk played in user decision-making
regarding the use of SNS. Hu, et al. (2015) found that users believed the benefits
associated with SNS usage outweighed the risks associated with sharing their personal
information. Gerlach, Widjaja, and Buxmann (2015) explored the impact of SNS privacy
policies on user intention to share personal information. Gerlach, et al. (2015) found that
the permissiveness of a SNS privacy policy negatively impacted a user’s desire to share
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personal information. However, Gerlach, et al. (2015) also found that the perceived risks
associated with the privacy policy served as a mediating factor in user desire to share
personal information. Gao, Liu, Guo, and Li (2018) explored issues of ubiquitous
connectivity to SNS via mobile devices. According to Gao, et al. (2018), ubiquitous
connectivity to SNS can result in negative psychological impacts on users, as well as
inadvertent leakage of personal information.
Matook, Cummings, and Bala (2015) examined how personal SNS usage impacted
user perceptions of loneliness. Matook, et al. (2015) found that employees who travel
frequently may suffer greater feelings of loneliness and that organizations may benefit
from encouraging SNS usage in these cases. Additionally, Matook, et al. (2015)
recommended that organizations should focus on creating policies which encourage
positive outcomes from employee use of SNS. Ali-Hassan, et al. (2015) examined
employee use of personal SNS in the workplace and the associated impact on the
organization. Ali-Hassan, et al. (2015) found that hedonic use of personal SNS in the
workplace had mixed results, with a negative impact on employee productivity, but a
positive impact on employee creativity as well as an increase in employee social capital.
Ali-Hassan, et al. (2015) also recommended organizations encourage the use of personal
SNS during work hours, and to allow the line between work and personal social activities
to blur, to have a positive impact on overall job performance. Turel and Qahri-Saremi
(2016) probed the problematic issues associated with SNS usage concerning
undergraduate student academic performance. Turel and Qahri-Saremi (2016) supported
the idea that educational institutions should focus on helping students find ways to
control problematic information systems (IS) usage while enrolled, and beyond.
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Wakefield and Wakefield (2016) explored the impact of user passion and affect on SNS
usage. Surprisingly, one finding in the Wakefield and Wakefield (2016) study was there
was no relationship between user excitement about an event and SNS usage at the event.
However, Wakefield and Wakefield (2016) found that while excitement may not directly
induce SNS usage at an event, it may contribute to a belief that the event is conducive to
meet some need, which would lead to SNS usage.
As the literature shows, SNS presents both benefits and challenges to employees and
organizations. Employees can benefit both personally and professionally from SNS
usage, and so are inclined to use it. The literature also shows that organizations can be
put at risk from SNS usage. What is unexplored in the literature is the financial risk that
organizations can face as a result of their executives’ use of personal SNS.
Organization classification
Existing literature reveals that various criteria can be used to classify organizations in
different ways. As Flack (2016) noted, the classification of organizations can occur
across multiple considerations such as the number of employees, annual revenue, as well
as the number of locations, and these considerations can vary by industry. National
Institute of Standards and Technology (2011) published a report that focused on the
management of information security risk from the organizational view. National Institute
of Standards and Technology (2011) outlined different sectors for organizational
groupings, such as legal, finance, information technology, and regulatory compliance,
among others, and stated that managing information security risks required expertise
specific to that particular sector.
Buonanno et al. (2005) explored different ways in which organizations could be
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classified by exploring existing IS literature through the lens of enterprise resource
planning (ERP) adoption. Buonanno, et al. (2005) found discussed classification criteria
for organizations, such as company size, market area, membership in an industrial group,
the presence of branch offices, diversification level, and the degree of functional
extension. Flack (2016) echoed some, but not all, of these same criteria.
J. W. Lee, Seong, and Lee (2012) explored the ways organizations can be classified
through the lens of human resources management. J. W. Lee, et al. (2012) explored
existing taxonomy for organization classification by way of literature review and
discovered it was lacking. According to J. W. Lee, et al. (2012), existing organization
taxonomy literature failed to scientifically group organizations, thus exposing a gap in the
literature.
According to DeSalvo, Limehouse, and Klimek (2016), the United States Census
Bureau classified organizations by industrial sector, the legal form of the organization, as
well as federal tax status. Quttainah and Paczkowski (2014) explored the ways privately
held organizations could be classified while undergoing valuation for potential purchase.
As Quttainah and Paczkowski (2014) noted, rational business owners will choose to seek
the highest value for their organization at the time of sale, but if both parties cannot agree
on a price, they may call an appraiser in to offer input. As part of this process, appraisers
may classify an organization based on criteria such as cash flow, the effectiveness of
current management, and the uncertainty associated with the span of control to be held by
the owner post-sale (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2014).
Extant literature showed multiple methods by which organizations can be classified.
The literature also showed that the management of information security risks required
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expertise specific to that classification. Thus, it is important to research financial risks
for organizations across a diverse set of organizational classifications in order for the
results to be both rigorous and generalizable.
Organization executives
Existing literature has explored organization executives through multiple lenses. As
early as Hambrick (1981), literature explored the impact that executives had on the
success of their organization. The seminal work of Hambrick and Mason (1984), which
offered the Upper Echelons perspective model, served as a foundation for exploring
various ways to predict organizational outcomes. According to Hambrick and Mason
(1984), organizational outcomes are reflections of top managers and their values.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) also argued that the behavior and characteristics of
executives mattered as it related to organizational outcomes. Hambrick and Mason
(1984) theorized that top managers made strategic choices that would impact the
performance of the organization. According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), the success
or failure of these choices could be partially predicted based on observable criteria such
as age, functional tracks, prior career experiences, education level, socioeconomic
background, financial position, and group characteristics.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) referenced existing literature with conflicting findings.
Notably, Hall (1977) argued that organizations effectively run themselves in the form of
inertia and are mostly immune to executive behaviors. Additionally, Hannan and
Freeman (1977) used an ecological lens to examine organizational behavior and found
that organization executives fail to substantially impact outcomes due to both internal and
external pressures which impact the organization, and are outside of executive control.
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As Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) noted, researchers attempted to bridge the gap
between these two competing views by offering a contingency approach. According to
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), the concept of managerial discretion was a theory to
bridge this gap. Building on prior literature, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) refined the
Upper Echelons perspective model, by offering managerial discretion as a moderating
variable. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) described managerial discretion as the degree
of freedom available to top executives to make decisions. According to Finkelstein and
Hambrick (1990), in situations where managerial discretion was low, executive
effectiveness was limited, and the Upper Echelons perspective model did not hold up
well and was unable to explain the situation adequately. However, Finkelstein and
Hambrick (1990) observed that in situations where managerial discretion was high,
executive effectiveness was not limited, and the Upper Echelons perspective model held
up well and was able to explain the situation adequately. Hambrick, Finkelstein, and
Mooney (2005) further refined the Upper Echelons perspective model by introducing
executive job demands as an additional moderating variable. According to Hambrick, et
al. (2005), executives who faced heavy job demands would take mental shortcuts, and
rely on solutions they had seen work successfully in the past, so their backgrounds and
prior experiences effectively colored their decisions. However, Hambrick, et al. (2005)
found that executives with lighter job demands had the flexibility and freedom to be more
comprehensive in their analyses and were ultimately better positioned to make a decision
that more objectively addressed the situation at hand.
Building on Hambrick and Mason (1984), Hambrick, et al. (2005) argued that senior
executives are of specific interest because they serve as an interface between the
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organization and its environment, and wield sufficient power to impact the organization.
According to Hambrick, et al. (2005), executive-level work is qualitatively different from
work found at other levels of the organization. Hambrick, et al. (2005) also found that
executive leadership behaviors could impact both the vitality and performance of their
organization and thus warranted further examination.
Organization executives are of particular interest to adversaries, because of the level
of access and oversight they have. Krombholz, et al. (2015) outlined whaling attacks, a
type of phishing attack, which targets organization executives explicitly. Adversaries can
use whaling attacks to achieve different goals. For example, Hong (2012) described
whaling attacks targeting chief operating officers (CEOs) with fake subpoenas as email
attachments, which had malware installed. In 2016, a finance executive at Mattel was the
victim of a whaling attack, nearly resulting in a loss of $3 million via EFT (Associated
Press, 2016). Holland, Amado, and Marriott (2018) reported on cybercriminals offering
access to executive email accounts for as little as $150.
Organizational information disclosure
A review of the literature regarding organizational information disclosure revealed
the presence of multiple themes in the space. This section will review some of those
themes, which include organizational challenges in responding to customer privacy
concerns, challenges present in protecting organizational data, and the possible market
reactions organizations face when they suffer from unauthorized disclosure of
information.
Greenaway and Chan (2013) proposed a framework that organizations could use to
create a customer data privacy policy. Greenaway, Chan, and Crossler (2015) were able
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to utilize a case study methodology to provide six lessons learned to assist organizations
in overcoming challenges associated with maintaining their customer data privacy
initiatives. Wakefield (2013) studied the effect of user affect in the disclosure of personal
information on commercial websites. Among the findings, Wakefield (2013) observed
that users were more likely to disclose personal information to a website if their initial
experience with the website was enjoyable, even if the user was not familiar with any
organizational policies regarding the safekeeping of users personal information. The
impact of user affect on personal information disclosure was explored by Kehr,
Kowatsch, Wentzel, and Fleisch (2015). Similar to the findings in the Wakefield (2013)
study, Kehr, et al. (2015) found that users were more likely to disclose personal
information when in a positive affective state while using an information system.
Greenaway, et al. (2015) proposed a conceptual framework to help organizations
reconcile their legal and ethical responsibilities to customers concerning their personal
data, and organizational responsibilities to adhere to internal information management
objectives. Among their findings, Greenaway, et al. (2015) observed that organizations
need to make a fundamental determination as to whose interests they are operating in,
how they will use the information collected, and to what degree they should extend
beyond any legal requirements in order to provide a higher degree of protection for their
customer's personal data.
Organizations also face challenges in regards to protecting corporate data. Conger,
Pratt, and Loch (2013) explored the challenges organizations face in protecting corporate
data. Among their findings in this area, Conger, et al. (2013) noted that data collection
and sharing among organizations, combined with the growing number of methods to
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customer data, pose a significant challenge to organizations in their efforts to protect data
collected. Hsu, et al. (2015) studied the effectiveness of extra-role behaviors exhibited by
organization workers as they relate to information security policy effectiveness. Defined
as employee behaviors that extend beyond those described in organizational security
policies, Hsu, et al. (2015) found that when combined with in-role behaviors, extra-role
behaviors have a positive impact on organizational security policy effectiveness. Lowry
and Moody (2015) proposed a new model which examined employee motivations, in an
attempt to determine employee intent to comply with new organization security policies.
This model, which combined control theory with reactance theory, found that
organizational controls were a positive predictor of an employee’s intent to comply with
new security policy, while perceived threats to personal freedom resulted in employee
reactance to new security policy. Lowry, et al. (2015) explored how organizations could
leverage fairness theory and reactive theory to increase the likelihood that employees
would adhere to organizational security policies. Among their findings, Lowry, et al.
(2015) discovered that employees were more likely to adhere to organizational security
policies if an atmosphere of organization trust existed. Lowry, et al. (2015) found that
one method to increase the level of organizational trust was through the implementation
of explanation adequacy, used to inform employees of the underlying reason and
subsequent importance of organizational security policy. C. H. Lee, Geng, and
Raghunathan (2016) examined the impact of mandatory standards on the effectiveness of
organizational information security. Among their findings, C. H. Lee, et al. (2016)
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reported that the implementation of a higher security standard does not necessarily lead to
an increase in security for an organization.
Existing literature has also explored the marketplace consequences organizations can
face after suffering a data breach. Wang, Kannan, and Ulmer (2013) examined the
impact organizations may face when publicly disclosing a data breach event. Wang, et
al. (2013) found no significant difference in marketplace reaction when an organization
disclosed a data breach in financial reporting documents, but that the marketplace did
respond differently when an organization announced a breach outside the release of
financial reporting documents.
Summary
Overall, the review of the literature revealed a gap in the understanding of the
financial risks that organizations face from executives’ use of personal SNS. This gap
merited further exploration and supported the justification for this study. The literature
review showed that the actions of their executives’ impact organizations. Specifically,
the literature review showed that executives merit specific scrutiny because they interface
between the organization and its environment and are powerful enough to impact the
organization. Furthermore, executive-level work is different from the work done by
others in the organization. Next, the literature review showed that executive behaviors
could impact the performance of their organization, and thus warranted further
examination. Additionally, the literature review showed the lack of a seminal definition
of information security, thus making it difficult for organizations to approach the concept
in a coherent, organized manner. Finally, the literature review showed that organizations
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face challenges in protecting their data and that they can suffer negative financial impacts
as a result.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodology used for this research study. This chapter
also contains details about the research methodology employed and how the researcher
developed and validated the research instrument. Additionally, population and sample
size is discussed. Next, this chapter discusses how collected research data was analyzed.
Finally, this chapter discusses the resources used to conduct this research study.
Overview of research methodology and design
According to Creswell and Creswell (2018), researchers should identify their
worldview as a fundamental component of any study they conduct. Creswell and
Creswell (2018) identify four distinct worldviews: Postpositivism, Constructivism,
Transformative, and Pragmatism. Creswell and Creswell (2018) describe the
constructivist worldview as an approach typically used with qualitative research.
Constructivist researchers do not start with a theory, instead choosing to generate or
develop a theory based on observations (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Based on this
description, Constructivist was the researcher’s worldview for this study.
Grounded theory methods (GTM) were first proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967),
although they have since split into two distinct camps after a public falling out between
Glaser and Strauss over fundamental issues (Urquhart, Lehmann, & Myers, 2009).
Matavire and Brown (2017) outlined subsequent advances in GTM, referring to the two
camps as “classic” and “evolved.” According to Matavire and Brown (2017), the work of
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Charmaz and others falls into the “evolved” faction of GTM, and are the methods used
for this study. GTM can apply to both qualitative and quantitative research data
(Charmaz, 1995). GTM emphasizes theory development and allows researchers to aim at
various levels of theory when conducting research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). The use of
GTM allows the researcher to discover concepts that are grounded in collected data, as
well as determining their underlying sources (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Glaser and
Strauss (1967) argued that GTM could be used to develop new theory by focusing on the
differences between daily realities of behaviors and how those behaviors are interpreted
by those who engage in those behaviors (Suddaby, 2006). When used correctly, GTM
can produce high-level theories that are generalizable and useful (Urquhart & Fernández,
2013). Because there is little understanding of the degree of financial risk posed to an
organization by way of executives’ use of SNS, the use of GTM provided an avenue to
determine the answer to the research question for this study.
Research methods employed
This study of financial risks associated with executive use of SNS was qualitative.
Data collection focused on the specific behaviors that executives can engage in via SNS
usage, which could result in financial risks to an organization.
This study advanced current research by gaining a deeper understanding of how
executives' behaviors on SNS impact financial risks to the organization. This deeper
understanding came about as a result of collecting examples of executive behaviors from
information security professionals, which they believe could pose a financial risk to the
organization. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews using open-ended
questions to collect data about these behaviors. This study collected the perceptions of
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the respondents interviewed to answer the research question and to help build an
emergent theoretical model to assist organizations in dealing with financial risks
associated with executives’ use of SNS.
A qualitative research approach was justified for this study, in part to help inform the
emergent theoretical model for the study. Additionally, a qualitative research approach
was needed to collect data about executive SNS behaviors that may pose a financial risk
to the organization. The researcher used semi-structured interviews to collect the
qualitative data needed for this study. Interviews do come with associated risks:
artificiality of the interview, lack of trust; lack of time; level of entry; elite bias;
Hawthorne effects, constructing knowledge, ambiguity of language, and interview
abandonment by the interviewee (Myers & Newman, 2007).
Instrument development and validation
Boudreau, Gefen, and Straub (2001) observed, IS researchers should seek to ensure
research is rigorous, by validating the instruments used to collect data. Venkatesh,
Brown, and Bala (2013) noted that researchers should discuss the validity of design,
analysis, and findings within the separate contexts of both qualitative and quantitative
research. Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen (2004) offered a set of guidelines for ensuring
research validity. According to Straub, et al. (2004), construct validity, internal
consistency, inter-rater reliability, and statistical conclusion validity are mandatory.
The researcher used a list of open-ended interview questions for this study. The
interview guide was first tested with two subject matter experts to assess the types of
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questions, validity, and reliability of the data, which resulted in minimal changes to the
interview guide prior to use.
Descriptive demographic data about study respondents was collected prior to the
interview by use of a Qualtrics survey instrument. Collected data included age range,
education level, ethnicity, gender, household income, industry currently employed in, and
details regarding their career to ensure they met population requirements for this study
prior to being interviewed.
Population and sample
Creswell and Creswell (2018) identified the key aspects of population and sampling
to describe a research plan adequately. Those aspects are described below and were
applied to this study.
Population description
The population for this study consisted of individuals who identify as information
security professionals currently working in-field or did so within the last 24 months.
Additionally, the population had sufficient work experience in the information security
field, such that it allowed them to speak from a place of authority as it related to
executive SNS behaviors they have either witnessed directly or have heard related
examples of executive SNS behaviors from others that they found to be credible. In order
to meet this criterion, the population had a minimum of five years of information
security-related work experience.
Sampling techniques
Single-stage sample design is appropriate when the researcher has access to the
population and can sample them directly (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Because of the
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researcher’s direct and indirect access to the population, a single-stage sample design was
the appropriate choice for this study. Creswell and Creswell (2018) described three types
of sampling: random, systemic, and nonprobability. As Creswell and Creswell (2018)
noted, obtaining a random sample may be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. The
ability to generate a systemic sample will also prove to be problematic, as well.
Accordingly, the researcher used a nonprobability sample technique to select respondents
for this study. While nonprobability sampling is not the optimal choice, Creswell and
Creswell (2018) noted that it is a frequently used method to choose respondents. Sample
size determination needed to be taken into account as well. As Creswell and Creswell
(2018) observed, sample size determination is a tradeoff between more accuracy, time,
and cost.
Qualitative research uses the concept of saturation to help determine sample size
(Mason, 2010). Charmaz (2006) observed that reaching saturation can be a function of
the aims of a study, thus making the sample size difficult to determine. Brinkmann and
Kvale (2015) suggested that general interview studies need between 5 and 25 interviews.
While the researcher anticipated data saturation at 15 respondents, data saturation
occurred after the ninth respondent at which time the researcher discontinued interviews.
Data collection
Data collection initiated with the identification of subject matter experts in the field of
information security. The researcher identified a total of 21 individuals as potential study
respondents. Next, the researcher asked these individuals to participate in this study, with
all of them agreeing to do so. Once the individuals agreed to participate, they were sent a
link to a Qualtrics survey instrument used to collect demographic data. The researcher
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scheduled interviews after verifying the respondent submitted demographic data. The
anticipated time for interviews was 30-45 minutes, with actual times ranging from 25-55
minutes. The researcher conducted interviews between February 2019 and March of
2020. The researcher conducted one interview in-person and the rest via WebEx online
meeting software. Interviews were conducted only after obtaining informed consent from
the respondent and were recorded with the respondent’s permission. Interviews and
initial coding were conducted in the same period, to minimize the amount of time needed
to collect data and begin the initial coding process. When needed, follow-up questions
were sent to respondents via email to gain further insight into topics.
Respondents ranged in age from mid-20s to mid-50s. All respondents had some level
of college education, with most of them completing either a bachelor’s or master’s
degree. The respondents were mostly male, and all had at least five years of information
security work experience. Over half of the respondents reported having more than ten
years of industry experience.
At the conclusion of each interview, the researcher reviewed the resulting audio file
to ensure successful recording. Next, the researcher sent the audio file to a paid
transcription service, which returned a transcript within one day. The researcher
reviewed the transcripts for accuracy and allowed the respondent to do the same. After
verification, the researcher imported the transcript into ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data
analysis application. The use of ATLAS.ti allowed the researcher to code interviews,
sort, and explore the data in order to discover themes, categories, and relationships.
The researcher interviewed a total of nine respondents. The first interview was a pilot
in order to ensure the interview script would meet study objectives. The researcher sent
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the first transcript to an experienced academic researcher for validation that the research
question was being addressed.
Data analysis
Data analysis should follow generally acceptable standards (Pratt, 2009; Romano Jr.,
Donovan, Chen, & Nunamaker Jr., 2003; Venkatesh, et al., 2013). Qualitative data is so
rich that researchers should aggregate it into somewhere between five and seven distinct
themes (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Researchers should use qualitative software in
order to ease the burden of data analysis (Bringer, Johnston, & Brackenridge, 2006;
Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Peters & Wester, 2007; Romano Jr., et al., 2003). The use of
qualitative software is especially appropriate when using GTM (Bringer, et al., 2006).
Creswell and Creswell (2018) outline a five-step process to analyze qualitative data,
which includes: organizing and preparing data for analysis; read or look at the data; data
coding; generating a description and themes; representing the description and themes.
Interviews were electronically recorded and sent out for professional transcription in
order to add validity to the process. Additionally, the researcher addressed
trustworthiness and authenticity concerns by sending transcripts to the respondents to
ensure the accuracy of the data before analysis. The researcher then imported transcripts
into ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis application.
Coding was done in three phases, as described by Charmaz (2006): initial coding,
focused coding, and theoretical coding. Charmaz (2006) acknowledged the concept of
axial coding, which exists in the Strauss and Corbin version of GTM but described it as
optional. Coding is a non-linear process in GTM, and researchers should feel free to
move between coding methods as needed (Thornberg & Charmaz, 2012). Coding allows
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researchers to begin understanding what is happening in the data and to understand what
it means (Charmaz, 2006).
Initial coding is the process by which researchers begin to apply labels to data in
order to allow further exploration. Initial coding allows researchers to gradually analyze
and interpret respondents’ concerns regarding the problem being explored (Thornberg &
Charmaz, 2012). Focused coding is the process of taking codes generated in the initial
coding process and using them to sift through large amounts of data (Charmaz, 1995).
Theoretical coding allows researchers to highlight possible relationships between codes
developed during the focused coding phase, and to help tell a story in a theoretical
direction (Charmaz, 2006).
The researcher initially coded all interviews. Those initial codes revealed basic
concepts that the researcher then compiled and reviewed to address redundancy and
overlap. To address validity and reliability concerns, the researcher had a subject matter
expert also engage in initial coding of all interviews, using a codebook developed by the
researcher during his initial coding process. As McDonald, Schoenebeck, and Forte
(2019) observed, agreement between coders is an important part of qualitative research.
Agreement on codes by multiple people indicates consistency in the measurements
(McDonald, et al., 2019). When disagreement amongst coders exists, there are multiple
methods available to resolve the disagreement (MacPhail, Khoza, Abler, & Ranganathan,
2015; McDonald, et al., 2019; Wiesche, Jurisch, Yetton, & Krcmar, 2017). For this
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study, the researcher chose the meet/discuss/resolve approach as described in both
McDonald, et al. (2019) and Wiesche, et al. (2017).
According to Creswell and Creswell (2018), researchers can measure intercoder
agreement by using any reliability process checking present in qualitative data analysis
applications. Process checking was available in the ATLAS.ti software used for this
study, specifically Krippendorff’s alpha. The use of Krippendorff’s alpha is supported in
studies where two coders are coding the same data, and the data are nominal (McDonald,
et al., 2019). According to Krippendorff (2004), an alpha score of .800 or greater is
needed to ensure minimal agreement amongst coders.
Once the initial coding of all interviews was completed, the researcher moved on to
focused coding to develop themes that represented a common thread or idea. Finally, the
researcher utilized theoretical coding to develop the overarching dimensions which were
used to create the emergent theoretical model.
Resource requirements
Resources were needed to complete this study. Computing-based resources used
included a computer, word processing software, citation management software, Internet
connectivity, transcription services, video conferencing software, online survey tools,
corresponding survey tool delivery mechanisms, and statistical analysis software. Human
resources used included industry professionals in order to assist with instrument
validation, as well a serving as respondents. Additionally, human resources were needed
in the form of subject matter experts to assist with intercoder agreement of the results.
The computing-based resources were owned by the researcher, or available to him at no
charge because of his employment at a Georgia-based public university. The human
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resources were available as well, due to the numerous connections the researcher has to
the metro Atlanta area information security community, as well as having a substantial
global social media footprint via LinkedIn and Twitter.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the research methodology, which was used for
this study. The research methodology for this study was discussed. Instrument
development and validation for this study were also discussed. Population, sample size,
and sampling techniques for this study were also discussed. Finally, the data analysis
techniques used in this study were also discussed.
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Chapter 4
Results

Introduction
This chapter discusses the results of data analysis and findings for this research study.
The chapter explains the analysis method followed. Next, the chapter discusses the
demographic analysis that was conducted. A discussion of the detailed results of the
findings follows next. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the results.
Data analysis
The researcher conducted data analysis on respondent interview data, respondent
demographic data, and interview data coding. By using grounded theory methods
(GTM), concepts and themes emerged from the data, which ultimately led to the
discovery of overarching dimensions. The discovery of these overarching dimensions led
to the creation of an emergent theoretical model to explain the results.
Data analysis began with the researcher commencing with the initial coding process,
as described by Charmaz (2006). The researcher conducted initial data coding of each
interview immediately after receiving the professionally transcribed recording and
allowed the respondent to review it, thus addressing any concerns related to validity and
reliability. This process allowed the researcher to analyze the data using GTM and code
the interview data to discover relevant concepts, themes, and overarching dimensions.
As a result, interviews and initial coding overlapped as the researcher both continued to
engage in respondent interviews while also conducting initial data analysis. This overlap
was necessary, as it allowed the researcher to discover relevant concepts more quickly, as
34

well as to ascertain when data saturation occurred. Coding was done in three phases, as
described by Charmaz (2006): initial coding, focused coding, and theoretical coding.
Charmaz (2006) acknowledged the concept of axial coding, which exists in the Strauss
and Corbin version of GTM but described it as optional.
The discovery of the overarching dimensions present in the data led to the development
of an emergent theoretical model that may be used by future researchers and practitioners
to assist with protecting organizations from financial risks associated with executives’
use of their personal SNS channels.
Demographic analysis
Demographic data was collected prior to the interview by use of a Qualtrics survey
tool. Prior to analysis, data accuracy was checked by ensuring that no respondent had left
any portion of the survey blank. Once the data was verified, analysis commenced. Table
1 provides a breakdown of descriptive statistics for all respondents. Respondents' ages
ranged from the mid-20s to early 60s. Eight of the respondents identified their gender as
male, and one identified as female. Two respondents had some level of college education
but did not complete a degree of any type. Three respondents had a bachelor’s degree,
and four respondents had a master’s degree. Respondents reported working in various
industries, including educational services, financial services, and information services.
This sample is reflective of the information security industry in terms of gender,
ethnicity, educational level, and industry verticals. The sample for this study was 89%
male and 11% female. These numbers are similar to the 80% male and 20% female
gender breakdown reported by The United States Census Bureau (2020a) for information
security analysts in 2017. The sample is also reflective of the information security
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industry in terms of race and ethnicity. The ethnicity breakdown for the sample was 78%
White, 11% Asian, and 11% Black or African American. The United States Census
Bureau (2020c) reported the 2017 race and ethnicity breakdown for information security
analysts as 73.9% White, 9.52% Asian, and 12.5% Black. Next, the sample is reflective
of the information security industry in terms of educational level. 77% of the sample
reported having a bachelor’s degree or higher. This is similar to The Occupational
Information Network (2019) finding that 76% of information security analysts have a
Bachelor’s degree or higher. Finally, the sample is reflective of the information security
industry in terms of the representation of industry verticals. The industry breakdown for
the sample was 11% educational services, 11% financial services, 33% informationrelated services, and 44% professional, scientific or technical services. These numbers
closely relate findings reported by The United States Census Bureau (2020b) of 10%
educational services, 18% financial services, 33% information-related services, and 44%
professional, scientific or technical services. The single noteworthy exception here is the
difference in the information-related services field, but otherwise, the sample is reflective
of the information security industry.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Population (N=9)
Characteristic
N
Age
25-34
2
35-44
3
45-54
2
55-64
2

Percentage (%)
22%
33%
22%
22%

Gender
Female
Male

1
8

11%
89%

Ethnicity
White
Asian
Black or African American

7
1
1

78%
11%
11%

Education
Some college, no degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree

2
3
4

22%
33%
44%

Industry
Educational services
Financial services
Information
Professional, scientific or technical services

1
1
3
4

11%
11%
33%
44%

Industry experience
5-6 years
7-8 years
Longer than 10 years

2
2
5

22%
22%
56%

Respondent interview data analysis
Using ATLAS.ti for data analysis, the researcher engaged in the process of initial
coding on each interview immediately after being transcribed. As Charmaz (2006) noted,
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the use of initial coding allows the researcher to compile data into categories and discover
the existence of any processes that are present in the data. While engaged in the initial
coding process, the researcher also applied constant comparative methods, as described
by Charmaz (2006). When using constant comparative methods, researchers begin to
establish distinctions in the data, which allows the researcher to make comparisons at
each coding level (Charmaz, 2006).
The researcher recruited a subject matter expert to engage in initial coding of all
interviews in order to ensure the validity and reliability of the results. This process took
place in batches of two interviews at a time, whereby the researcher engaged in initial
coding of two interviews, which were then handed off to the subject matter expert for
them to initially code. The researcher supplied the codebook for the subject matter expert
use, which was generated from the researcher’s initial codes. Having agreement between
coders is an important component of any qualitative research effort (McDonald, et al.,
2019; Wiesche, et al., 2017). This iterative process allowed for the resolution of any
differences in coding, which is needed to ensure reliability in the results (MacPhail, et al.,
2015).
When coding conflicts occurred, the researcher and the subject matter expert would
meet via telephone, or remote messaging services like Microsoft Teams or Signal, to
discuss the conflict and reach consensus. Coding conflicts occurred in three rounds of
interview coding, resulting in the researcher and the subject matter expert meeting for a
total of approximately 90 minutes across three separate meetings. In total, 169 codes
were identified during the initial coding phase, and are shown in Appendix D. The
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resulting initial coding process identified the existence of basic concepts that respondents
identified during their interviews.
Researchers can measure intercoder agreement by using reliability process checking
tools that are present in qualitative data analysis applications (Creswell & Creswell,
2018). Such a reliability process checking tool was available in ATLAS.ti, namely
Krippendorff’s alpha. Krippendorff (2004) stated that an alpha score of .800 or greater is
needed to ensure minimal agreement between coders. The Krippendorff’s alpha score of
.874 was calculated after the initial coding and conflict resolution process, thus
confirming intercoder agreement in the initial coding process.
From there, the researcher moved on to focused coding of the data. Focused coding
allows the researcher to begin data synthesis and understanding larger segments of data
(Charmaz, 2006). The comparison of data against data is what allows for the creation of
focused codes (Charmaz, 2006). The resulting output of focused codes allowed the
researcher to identify themes that encompassed the concepts identified during the initial
coding process.
Once focused coding was complete, the researcher began the process of theoretical
coding analysis. Theoretical codes highlight possible relationships between the themes
identified during the focused coding process (Charmaz, 2006). The resulting theoretical
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code analysis resulted in the discovery of overarching dimensions in the data, which
became the elements of the emergent theoretical model.
Using GTM, the researcher presents the concepts, themes, and overarching dimensions
that emerged from the data collection and analysis process, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Emergent concepts, themes, and overarching dimensions
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Findings
Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data
The researcher found that loss of intellectual property or sensitive data included
situational awareness and blackmail. These themes and representative data are presented
in Appendix E.
Situational Awareness
Situational awareness is defined in the seminal Endsley (1995) article as “…the
perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (p.
36). Organizations are right to be worried about the risk associated with employees
disclosing confidential information (Fuduric & Mandelli, 2014). Working from the
Endsley (1995) definition, executives need to be aware of the possibility of financial risk
to the organization, which can result from the sharing of data (text or images) via their
personal SNS. As respondent #4 observed:
“We talk about we want to share pictures and share how great and wonderful it is
to work there, but we also want to be very aware of the surroundings when we
take pictures, of what we post that someone might be able to see pseudocode in
the background, or those types of things…”
As a result of these types of behaviors, organizations face a financial risk due to the
exposure of intellectual property or sensitive data.
Blackmail
(Merriam-Webster, n.d.) defines blackmail as “extortion or coercion by threats
especially of public exposure or criminal prosecution.” Respondents emphasized the
financial risk that organizations face as a result of their executives being blackmailed as a
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result of something they posted on their personal SNS. Respondent #3 offered this
observation regarding the financial risk to the organization associated with executive
blackmail scenarios:
“The business is higher profile, more prone to any sort of blackmail, ransom,
anything like that, and my belief is that they've got to be a little bit more careful about
what they post, how it's posted, when it's posted, and things like that.”
Compliance violations
The researcher found that compliance violations included HIPAA and SEC concerns.
These themes and representative data are presented in Appendix E.
HIPAA violations
U.S. lawmakers created The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA) to protect the privacy and security of certain types of health information
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). The act empowers the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to enforce the
act by conducting complaint investigations as well as conducting compliance reviews
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). Organizations that violate
HIPAA face potentially substantial fines (Green, 2007; Parks, Xu, Chu, & Lowry, 2017;
Solove, 2013). Organizations can face financial risk from executives sharing information
on their personal SNS, which violates HIPAA. As respondent #10 described, an
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executive can share patient information in the act of attempting to show organizational
competence, thus creating a HIPAA violation:
“Imagine an executive tweets something to the tune of ‘we're so good at what we do,
Beyonce chose our hospital for her healthcare.’ Unless this was very clearly approved by
Beyonce, this is a HIPAA violation at minimum.”
SEC violations
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the federal agency charged with
overseeing publicly traded organizations and can initiate civil action against lawbreakers,
or can also work with the Justice Department to initiate criminal actions (U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, n.d.). Organizations can face financial risk from executives
sharing information that violates securities law.
As respondent #10 described:
‘[For publicly traded organizations] there’s a lot of rules around what you can say that
is material to the business and how that is disseminated, so they've got to be very
careful. I think that, that from a financial risk perspective, that could cause fines and
loss of business, and potential, other legal lawsuit issues if they aren't careful about
what and how they say things that are material to the business.’
Harm to reputation
The researcher found that harm to reputation included public scandal and negative
social media incidents. These themes and representative data are presented in Appendix
E.
Public scandal
Public scandal can cause financial risk to an organization (Drew, Kelley, & Kendrick,
2006). An executive can cause a public scandal when they share information on their
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personal SNS, which draws negative attention to the executive, and by extension, the
organization. As respondent #5 offered:
“We've seen it go well, and we've seen it go horrifically wrong. The guy who shot
the rhino, right? The founder of Jimmy John's posed with big game, and it went
on his Facebook, and it went viral, and the company damn near went bankrupt
because people were, you know, like, ‘The guy's a horrible human being.’”
Respondent #1 offered this observation about executives having to balance the desire
to share information against the potential financial risk it can bring to the organization:
“I think you can do whatever you want to do; you just have to be careful and set some
boundaries with how you're going to use that media to influence, right? So you don't
want your personal life too much influencing the business life so-to-speak, if that
makes any sense”
Negative social media incident
Negative social media incidents can occur when an organization executive engages
with a customer, employee, vendor, or the public at large via their personal SNS. The
organization faces financial risk from these types of interactions, even when the incident
occurs on an executive’s personal SNS.
Respondent #5 described this situation, in which an executive participated in a
negative social media incident with someone:
“’Well, that must mean clearly, we think that's what the company says.’ I'm like,
‘Wait a second. Time out. This is on my own time.’ And they're like, ‘Yeah, but
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you don't get to do that.’ And so that was a harsh realization, I think, for me is that
there is no off time.”
In another example of a negative social media incident, respondent #8 described a
situation where an organization executive shared a negative experience involving an
organization customer while on vacation:
“Person went on vacation talked about the bad experiences they had at this resort.
Turns out, that that resort was one of their biggest clients and that resulted in some
interesting conversations”.
Fraudulent Transaction Loss
The researcher found that fraudulent transaction loss included C-level employee
impersonation and vendor impersonation. These themes and representative data are
presented in Appendix E.
C-Level executive impersonation
BEC attacks were responsible for losses of more than $1.7 billion in 2019 (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2020). Executives potentially expose their organizations to this
type of attack when they share information via their personal SNS. In this situation, the
ability of a cybercriminal to impersonate a C-Level executive is essential, as they rely on
the natural pressures a subordinate would feel to keep the executive happy or the fear of
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losing their job if they do not carry out the instructions of the C-Level executive. As
respondent #10 described:
“…if they know a senior executive is going to be, perhaps, out of comms for a weekend,
maybe that's a good time to start spoofing them, because they know that the real person
can’t be reached…”
When an organization executive shares details about their travel plans via their personal
SNS, that information can be used by a cybercriminal to make their attack feel more
authentic. As respondent #8 described:
“For example if a chief marketing officer just posted ‘hey, I'm going to be in
Bahamas next week,’ I know the location. Now, I know that that person is out of
office and I can use that information for let's say, social engineering…”
Vendor impersonation
Another form of BEC occurs when a cybercriminal impersonates a vendor to entice
an accounts payable employee to pay a fraudulent invoice being presented. One possible
scenario was described by respondent #1:
“Let's say the CFO's on vacation. The secretary or the office manager for the
finance department has some bills to pay. Suddenly somebody calls up and, ‘Hey.
This is an urgent bill. If you don't pay this bill today, by X time, we're going to
turn the lights out, or we're going to turn your internet connection off.’ Whatever
that scenario is, and she can't get in touch or he can't get in touch with the CFO,
suddenly now you've got people pressured to make a decision for the benefit of
the company without the oversight, and they were able to be socially engineered
because somebody got that information off of a public social media site…”
Summary of Results
The results of the data analysis conducted for this study generated an emergent
theoretical model that is grounded in the evidence found in the data. The emergent
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theoretical model (Figure 2) indicates the overarching dimensions that present financial
risks to organizations from executives’ use of their personal SNS.

Figure 2. Emergent theoretical model
Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data
The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes: Situational
awareness and Blackmail. The discovery of these themes is grounded in the information
provided by respondents during their interviews. Respondents offered multiple
observations of incidents in which organizations were faced with situations where their
intellectual property or other sensitive data was exposed through information shared by
executives’ personal SNS, this creating a financial risk to the organization. Additionally,
respondents were able to offer scenarios in which executives could expose intellectual
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property or sensitive data via their personal SNS, and thus expose their organization to
financial risk as a result.
Compliance violations
The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes: HIPAA
violations and SEC violations. The discovery of these themes is grounded in the
information provided by respondents during their interviews. Respondents offered
multiple instances of executives engaging in behavior on their personal SNS that resulted
in SEC investigations, thus exposing their organizations to financial risk. Additionally,
respondents were able to offer various scenarios where things executives share via their
personal SNS could result in either HIPAA or SEC violations, thus exposing their
organizations to financial risk.
Harm to reputation
The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes: Public scandal
and Negative social media incident. The discovery of these themes is grounded in the
information provided by respondents during their interviews. Respondents offered
multiple instances of executives sharing information via their personal SNS, which
resulted in either a public scandal for the organization or a negative social media incident,
which resulted in financial risk to the organization. Additionally, respondents were able
to envision multiple scenarios in which something an executive shared via their personal
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SNS could result in either a public scandal or negative social media event, which could
potentially result in financial risk to the organization.
Fraudulent Transaction Loss
The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes: C-Level
employee impersonation or Vendor impersonation. The discovery of these themes is
grounded in the information provided by respondents during their interviews.
Respondents were able to offer multiple instances of executives sharing information via
their personal SNS, which resulted in adversaries being able to impersonate a C-Level
executive, resulting in a successful BEC attack, thus exposing the organization to
financial risk. Respondents were also able to provide multiple instances where
information shared by an executive via their personal SNS allowed a cybercriminal to
impersonate a vendor that did or potentially did business with the organization. These
impersonations resulted in a successful BEC attack, which also exposed the organization
to financial risk. Furthermore, respondents were able to offer multiple scenarios wherein
information shared by an executive on their personal SNS could lead to successful BEC
attacks, thus potentially exposing the organization to financial risk.
Summary
This chapter provided a detailed overview of the methodological framework, data
coding, analysis, and interpretation used in this study. Four overarching dimensions were
identified through data analysis: Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data;
Compliance violations; Harm to reputation; and Fraudulent Transaction Loss. The
respondents’ quotes that were related to their statements in each of the four overarching
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dimensions were also presented. Next, this chapter discussed the findings of the study,
showing how respondent data were grouped into themes, which ultimately led to the
discovery of the overarching dimensions for this study. Finally, this chapter presented
the four overarching dimensions in an emergent theoretical model that answered the
research question for this study.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Introduction
This chapter presents the conclusions reached in this study. The research question
will be outlined and answered, and implications for the study will be discussed. Finally,
this chapter concludes with recommendations for future study.
Conclusions
The goal of this study was to explore what financial risks organizations face from
executives’ use of their personal SNS. This study addressed the research question
proposed in this study: What executive personal SNS behaviors pose financial risks to an
organization? In this study, the researcher interviewed nine information security
professionals to uncover their perceptions and experiences in order to provide answers to
the research question.
The study met its overall goal of answering the research question and generating an
emergent theoretical model. This study utilized a grounded theory approach to collect
qualitative data by interviewing nine information security professionals regarding their
personal experiences, beliefs, and perceptions of financial risks that organizations face
from executives’ use of their personal SNS. The data analysis conducted for this study
resulted in the discovery of overarching dimensions, themes, and concepts that addressed
the research question for this study. The results of this study revealed four overarching
dimensions of executives’ behavior on their personal SNS that pose financial risks to
organizations: Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data; Compliance Violations;
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Harm to Reputation; and Fraudulent Transaction Loss. Furthermore, these overarching
dimensions were grounded in underlying themes. A summary of these dimensions and
themes are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Summary of Overarching Dimensions and Themes
Overarching Dimensions
Themes
Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive
Data
Situational Awareness
Blackmail
Compliance Violations
HIPAA violations
SEC violations
Harm to Reputation
Public Scandal
Negative Social Media incident
Fraudulent Transaction Loss

C-level Employee impersonation
Vendor impersonation

The discovery of these items led to the creation of an emergent theoretical model that
explains the financial risks that organizations face from executives’ use of their personal
SNS and thus addressed the research question for this study.
This study has strengths. One strength is the researcher’s years of industry
experience. This experience allowed the researcher to understand industry jargon used
by the respondents in the interview process and allowed the researcher to easily grasp the
significance of respondents’ statements about how a particular given example was
important in answering the study’s research question. Another strength of this study is
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the use of grounded theory to explore the study’s research question. The researcher’s use
of grounded theory allowed him to collect ground truth from industry experts without
relying on a theoretical lens through which to view the data, and thus avoid bias. The
grounding of concepts found in the reality of the data collected is key to the use of
grounded theory, as it helps the researcher guard against internal bias (Corbin & Strauss,
1990). Yet another strength is the diversity of the industry verticals reflected in the
demographic, and how closely their percentages mirror the data reported by The United
States Census Bureau (2020b). The generalizability of this study’s findings is increased
as a result of this diversity and percentage of individual industry representation.
This study has weaknesses. The previously mentioned researcher’s industry
experience could be considered a weakness as it opened the possibility of researcher bias
due to prior firsthand experiences. To counter the potential bias, the researcher made
every attempt to discard previously held assumptions and engage in active listening to
respondents’ answers with an open mind. Another weakness is the potential for elite bias
to influence the data collection process. The researcher countered the potential bias by
interviewing respondents of varying statuses to capture a broader understanding of the
phenomenon being studied. Another weakness is not testing the emergent theoretical
model created in this study. While a weakness, the lack of testing of the emergent
theoretical model is also an avenue for future research.
Lastly, this study has limitations. One limitation was the access to information
security professionals who would commit to sitting for an interview due to time
constraints or general availability issues. Another limitation was the researcher’s
available time to conduct interviews and subsequent data analysis. Yet another limitation
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relates to the generalizability of the results. The respondents were all located in the same
geographical area of one major city in the southeast United States. As a result, the results
found in this study may not apply to other geographical regions in the United States or
foreign countries. Another limitation of the study relates to some of the data collected for
the Compliance violations overarching dimension. While the industries represented in
the study are varied, all respondents pointed to two types of compliance violations in
their interviews – HIPAA and SEC. As a result, the associated themes are inferences
based on interview data. While regulatory violations apply to all market verticals, some
verticals are more directly impacted by these particular regulations than others.
Implications
No known published qualitative research exists that presents findings of the financial
risks organizations face from executives’ use of their personal SNS. These behaviors
create financial risk for organizations because of the information executives sometimes
share, which cybercriminals then leverage for use in attacks (Palmer, 2020; SocialEngineer LLC, 2019). Cybercriminals attacking organizations is not a new or novel idea.
What is novel, and thus worthy of study, is understanding the financial risks
organizations may face as a result of information executives share in their personal SNS.
This study has implications for the information security personnel tasked with
protecting their organization from threats, as this newly discovered threat vector may
require a change in operational procedures. This study also has implications for
organization risk management personnel who may not have been aware of the threats
which come from their executives' use of their personal SNS and thus have not factored
this newly discovered threat vector into their overall risk management process. Finally,
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this study also has implications for organization policy, human resources, and legal
personnel who may not have been aware of the threat from this newly discovered vector
and may now have to craft new management policies or employment contracts.
Recommendations
This study was a grounded theory research effort designed to discover financial risks
that organizations may face from executives’ use of their personal SNS. Future research
is needed to test the emergent theoretical model put forth in this study. Future research
should also be done to confirm the overarching dimensions and themes discovered in this
study, possibly using a different research method such as Delphi panel or quantitative
survey instrument. Future research should also explore the possibility of cues being
present that could help organizations minimize the financial risks they face when
executives use their personal SNS. Once such research possibility is a retrospective
inspection of the information executives share, in order to develop guidelines for
executives regarding what they share via their personal SNS. Another such research
possibility is to explore proactive steps executives can use to minimize financial risks to
their organization when they do share information via their personal SNS. For example,
exploring personal circumstances such as the use of a personal device for work and
personal matters, device exposure when personal, intimate relationships end, or
children’s use of the executive’s personal or corporate computing assets are all areas that
warrant future research.
Recommendations for information security, legal, and human resources practitioners
include using the overarching dimensions and themes discovered in this study to conduct
a risk assessment to determine the extent to which their organization may be at risk. If
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supported by risk assessment findings, organization information security personnel
should explore processes to monitor their executives’ personal SNS channels. If also
supported by risk assessment findings, organizations human resources and legal
personnel should explore the creation of new organization policies that specifically target
executives’ use of their personal SNS. Such policies may seek to create boundaries
around what executives can share or may even seek to prohibit such behavior. Next,
human resources and legal practitioners may seek to prohibit executives’ use of personal
SNS as a term of employment by including appropriate language in employment
contracts. Finally, information security practitioners, in collaboration with human
resources and legal practitioners, may seek to create a security education, training, and
awareness (SETA) program that specifically targets executives and their use of personal
SNS, to educate and raise overall awareness for this special group of employees with a
specific threat vector.
Summary
This study addressed the research question: what executive personal SNS behaviors
pose financial risks to an organization. The study was relevant due to the lack of extant
literature on the research question being asked. The study explored the research question
through the use of GTM. The researcher chose GTM because the nature of the research
question being asked required the collection of ground truth based on the observations
and experiences of qualified information security professionals.
The researcher developed a semi-structured interview question guide to answer the
research question. The questions were open-ended and designed to elicit thick, rich data
for analysis. The researcher developed the question guide and then had two subject
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matter experts vet it in order to assess the questions and to ensure the validity and
reliability of the data to be collected. The researcher collected demographic data from
respondents before conducting interviews. The researcher interviewed all respondents
either in-person or via meeting-at-distance software and recorded all interviews after
obtaining permission.
Before commencing full data collection, the researcher conducted a pilot interview
with a respondent to ensure the question guide would ensure the collection of the data
needed to meet study objectives. The researcher conducted initial coding of the
interview, then had the coding and interview data reviewed for validity by an experienced
academic researcher. After receiving positive feedback on the initial coding and interview
data collected, the researcher commenced with full data collection.
Respondents responded to the questions asked, with the researcher having the
flexibility to ask probing or follow-up questions as needed throughout the interview.
Once the researcher concluded the interview, the audio recording was sent out for
transcription. The researcher allowed each respondent to review the transcribed file to
ensure validity and authenticity. The researcher commenced with the initial coding of the
interview immediately afterward. The researcher engaged a subject matter expert to code
each interview as well. The researcher provided the interviews to the subject matter
expert in groups of two, and also provided a codebook developed by the reviewer during
his initial coding process, to use in their coding process. Coding conflicts occurred in
three rounds of interview coding, which resulted in the researcher and the subject matter
expert meeting three separate times for a total of approximately 90 minutes, in order to
reach a consensus on all conflicts. Once the initial coding process was completed, the
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researcher calculated a Krippendorff’s alpha to ensure intercoder agreement. The
Krippendorff’s alpha score was .874, thus confirming intercoder agreement in the initial
coding process. The initial coding process allowed the researcher to identify basic
concepts present in the data, and the initial codes were the output needed for the next step
in the coding process.
Next, the researcher commenced focused coding of the data, using the initial codes
identified in the previous step. Focused coding allows the researcher to synthesize and
understand larger chunks of data, as Charmaz (2006) explained. By comparing data
against data, the researcher was able to create the focused code output that was needed
for the next step in the coding process and allowed the researcher to identify themes that
encompassed the concepts identified in the initial coding phase.
The final step in the coding process was theoretical coding. Theoretical coding
highlights relationships between themes identified during the focused coding process
(Charmaz, 2006). Theoretical coding relied on the output of focused codes from the
previous step and resulted in the identification of the overarching dimensions in the data,
which helped form the emergent theoretical model that addressed the study’s research
question.
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Research Question - What executive social networking site (SNS) behaviors pose
financial risks to an organization?
Introduction:
My name is Andy Green, and I am a Ph.D. candidate who is studying how executives’
use of their personal social networking sites could pose financial risks to their
organization, for my dissertation to finish my degree. I appreciate you taking the time to
talk with me so that I can get your thoughts on the area I am researching.
Before we begin, I want to let you know that I will treat this interview confidentially. I
will take the necessary steps to anonymize your responses so that they cannot be traced
back to you. I will also be using a couple of voice recorders so that I can transcribe this
interview for use in my analysis. One device is the primary, and the other is a backup in
case some type of problem happens with the primary. After ensuring there was no
recording problem with the primary, I will immediately delete the recording on the
backup recorder.
If at any point I ask a question that you’re not comfortable answering, just say so and I
can skip it. Also, you have the right to end this interview at any time, for any reason, no
explanation needed.
After we finish our interview, I will provide the recording to a professional transcription
service so they can turn our interview into a text document I can use for my analysis.
I will encrypt both the interview recording and the associated transcription, so as to keep
them from being accessed by unauthorized individuals. I will only decrypt them when I
have to access them for work on my research.
Before we begin the interview and I start recording, do you have any questions for me?
Questions:
1. Let’s start with you telling me a little bit about yourself? Your name, where you
work, your job title, how long you’ve worked for your current organization, and
how long you’ve worked in information security overall?
2. How would you describe your day-to-day workload and responsibilities?
3. What are your overall thoughts about social media in general?
4. Do you use social media yourself?
a. Probe - Can you share any stories about your own social media
experiences that were noteworthy for you in some way?
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5. What are your overall thoughts about how employees use social media?
a. Probe – Can you share any stories about situations you’ve seen or heard
about, involving a co-worker’s use of social media that was noteworthy to
you in some way for them, or their organization?
6. What are your overall thoughts about organization executives who use social
media in a personal capacity?
a. Probe – Not just CEO “persona” – focus more on the entire C-suite, not
just the “face” of the organization (CTO, CIO, CISO, CFO, CMO, etc.)
7. Do you think organization executives’ use of social media in a personal capacity
could pose a risk to their organization?
a. Probe – Why or why not?
b. Probe – How so?
c. Probe – Financial risks?
8. Can you share any examples of situations where you thought that an executive’s
use of social media in a personal capacity may have exposed their organization to
risk?
a. Probe – How do you think that situation actually exposed the organization
to financial risk?
9. Do you think that executive use of social media in a personal capacity is a risk to
your organization?
a. Probe – Why or why not?
b. Probe - How so?
10. Are you concerned about organizational risks stemming from third party use of
personal social media?
a. Probe – Who are you worried about?
b. Probe – Why do they concern you?
11. Are there ways for an organization to minimize any risk exposure it may face
from one of its executives using social media?
a. Probe - What might those be?
12. Are there any advantages to an organization which arise from an executive’s use
of social media in a personal capacity?
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a. Probe - What might those be?
13. Thinking about your industry; What are your thoughts on the effect of personal
SNS usage by executives on their companies value?
14. If an executive were to come to you and ask, “What are some things I should or
shouldn’t do on my social media accounts”, what guidance would you give them?
a. Probe – Why?
15. Is there anything else you’d like to talk about that I haven’t asked?
16. Is there some question you think I should have asked, that I didn’t?
17. Would you mind if I contact you about this interview again, if I have follow-up
questions?
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Demographics Questions
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Demographics questions
All questions are optional in nature.
1. What is your age in years?
a. Under 21
b. 22-24
c. 25-34
d. 35-44
e. 45-54
f. 55-64
g. 65-74
h. 75 or older
2. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? (If you’re
currently enrolled in school, please indicate the highest degree you have
received.)
a. Less than a high school diploma
b. High school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED)
c. Some college, no degree
d. Associate degree (e.g. AA, AS)
e. Bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS)
f. Master’s degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd)
g. Professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM)
h. Doctorate (e.g. PhD, EdD)
3. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin?
a. Yes - Hispanic
b. Yes - Latino
c. Yes - Spanish
d. No
4. How would you describe yourself (select all that apply)?
a. White
b. Black or African American
c. American Indian or Alaska Native
d. Asian
e. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
f. Other (Text box)
5. What is your gender?
a. Female
b. Male
c. Non-binary/third gender
d. Prefer to self-describe (Text box)
6. What is your total household income?
a. Less than $60,000
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b. $60,000 to $69,999
c. $70,000 to $79,999
d. $80,000 to $89,999
e. $90,000 to $99,999
f. $100,000 to $109,999
g. $110,000 to $119,999
h. $120,000 to $129,999
i. $130,000 to $139,999
j. $140,000 to $149,999
k. $150,000 or greater
7. Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are
employed?
a. Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support
b. Real estate or rental and leasing
c. Mining
d. Professional, scientific or technical services
e. Utilities
f. Management of companies or enterprises
g. Construction
h. Admin, support, waste management or remediation services
i. Manufacturing
j. Educational services
k. Wholesale trade
l. Health care or social assistance
m. Retail trade
n. Arts, entertainment or recreation
o. Transportation or warehousing
p. Accommodation or food services
q. Information
r. Other services (except public administration)
s. Finance or insurance
t. Unclassified establishments
8. Are you currently employed in an information security or cyber security related
position?
a. Yes
b. No
9. How long have you worked in the information security or cyber security field?
a. Less than 1 year
b. 1-2 years
c. 3-4 years
d. 5-6 years
e. 7-8 years
f. 9-10 years
68

g. Longer than 10 years
10. How long have you worked at your current employer?
a. Less than 1 year
b. 1-2 years
c. 3-4 years
d. 5-6 years
e. 7-8 years
f. 9-10 years
g. Longer than 10 years
11. How long have you worked in your current position?
a. Less than 1 year
b. 1-2 years
c. 3-4 years
d. 5-6 years
e. 7-8 years
f. 9-10 years
g. Longer than 10 years
12. What is your current job title? (Text box)
13. Which of the following best describes your current job level?
a. Owner/Executive/C-Level
b. Senior management
c. Middle management
d. Intermediate
e. Entry-level
f. Other (please describe) (Text box)
14. About how many employees work for your current organization
a. 99 or fewer
b. 100-499
c. 500-999
d. 1000-4,999
e. 5,000+
15. About how much revenue does your current organization generate each year?
a. Less than $1M
b. $1M-$9M
c. $10M-$49M
d. $50M-$99M
e. $100M-$249M
f. $250M-$499M
g. $500M-$999M
h. $1B-$9B
i. $10B+
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List of Initial Codes
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"persona" social
media account
content vetted
ahead of time

keep followers on
personal social
media to a small
number

avoid personal life
social media posts
impacting business

keep work life off
social media

balance employee
free speech rights
against risk

kidnap attack
scenario

be careful when
posting pictures
taken in the
workplace

lack of employee
SETA

Prior job title

BEC attack
scenario

lack of executive
social media use
had no impact on
brand growth

block social media
access at work

lack of
organizational
ethics

block social media
access on corporate
assets

lack of social media
policies

broad targeting of
organizations
company Facebook
page run by
marketing staff
conduct a risk
assessment for
social media
concerns

leadership team
creates value in the
marketplace
little benefit from
executive use of
personal social
media

private group
conversations can
damage future
employment
chances
private group
conversations can
damage the
organization
provide social
media usage
training to all
employees
provide social
media usage
training to senior
executives
public social media
comments can
impact future
employment
opportunities
Rank and file
employees may be
more successful at
maintaining
"personal" vs.
"work" social
media accounts
Reason for leaving
prior job
receiving positive
feedback via
personal social
media
restrict employee
social media use
through contract

Location data used
as OSINT
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social media
positive value to
user
social media
sharing can provide
details about
organization
employees
Social media
training for
employees
social media use
can be a bad habit
social media use
causes risk to a
business client
social media use
depends on
employee rank in
organization

social media use
has become second
nature
social media used
as a temporary
distraction
social media used
for intelligence
gathering
social media used
for personal
branding

create more
restrictive social
media policies for
senior executives

loss of company
devices could lead
to negative social
media postings

resume details leak
details about an
organization

social media used
to acquire personal
knowledge

Current job
description

loss of employment
over personal social
media posts

risk from
compromised social
media account

social media used
to build a personal
following

Current job title

monitor senior
executive accounts
for policy violations

Risk tied to market
sector

social media used
to build corporate
reputation

Data classification

network attack
scenario

risk to competitive
advantage

Social media used
to connect with
others

risk to intellectual
property

Social media used
to educate friends

sales people using
social media
inappropriately to
make sales
connections

social media used
to for information
gathering

seeing co-workers
engage in negative
interactions on
social media

social media used
to maintain
personal
relationships

develop incident
response plan for
social media
incidents
different social
media platforms
used for different
objectives
differing risk
profiles

No separation
between personal
and professional
persona on social
media
only negative
consequences from
executive use of
personal social
media
organization can get
sued for senior
executives personal
social media
comments

difficult to calculate
value of executive
social media use

organization culture
towards social
media

Senior executive
awareness of
content shared via
social media

social media used
to maintain
professional
relationships

discloses upcoming
new product release
on social media

organization
employee listing
available on
linkedin

Senior executive
awareness of timing
of shared content
on social media

social media used
to monitor college
student behavior

Driven by different
motivations

organization size
factor in employee
sharing of company
information on
social media

Senior executive
belief that policies
don't apply to them

social media used
to sell corporate
products
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Employee fear of
reprisal from
leadership

organization use of
social media for
publicity purposes

employee feels
pressured to make
decision during
social engineering
attack

organization use of
social media to
boost employee
morale

employee leaking
credentials

organization uses
social media for
publicy
announcements

employee leaking
credentials via
twitter

organizations have
to balance
employee private
time against
company risk

Employee rank in
organization

organizations need
social media
sharing policies

employees
bypassing technical
controls
employees
inappropriately
sharing company
details
employees leaking
credentials via
facebook

senior executive
creates personal
risk by announcing
personal plans
ahead of time
Senior executive
making
inappropriate
comments on social
media
senior executive
personal trip details
used for social
engineering attack
against the
organization
Senior executive
should avoid
discussing business
on personal social
media channels
Senior executive
social media usage
negatively impacts
stock price

Organizations use
internal social
media to keep
employee
conversations
internal
organizations use
social media for
branding
themselves as
experts in field
organizations use
social media for
corporate branding
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social media used
to stay updated on
current events
social media users
engage in negative
interactions

social media users
post without
thinking

spouse usage of
social media
time spent with on
social media with
no organizational
benefit

Senior executive
successfully avoid
negative social
media interactions

time spent with on
social media with
no personal value

Senior executive
usage negatively
impacts
organization value

use controls to stop
others from posting
on your Facebook
page

senior executive use
personal social
media to promote
brand

use employee
social media
conversations for
social engineering
attacks

employees posting
normal events can
positively impact
organization
financial standing

organizations use
social media for
relationship
building with
customers

Employees should
have "work" and
"personal" social
media accounts

oversharing
personal details on
social media

senior executive use
use employee
personal social
social media details
media to share
to break in to home
knowledge

personal social
media usage can
impact relationships
with business
clients
personal social
employees talk
media usage giving
negatively about the
details about
organization
organization
security tools used
Employees spread
rumors about
organization via
social media

employees tweeting
network diagrams
Employees with
marketing
background will
avoid social media
posts that reflect
negatively on the
company
examples of
personal social
media usage
causing business
risk
executive should
consider adversarial
usage of their
tweets

senior executives at
high risk
organization should
avoid social media
use
senior executives
attending public
events will be
publicized by other
means

use multifactor
authentication

use risk assessment
to drive policy
creation

senior executives
avoid using social
media for fear of
job loss

use social media
platform's privacy
controls

personal social
media used for
mass dissemination
of information to
friends

senior executives
create
organizational risk
by announcing
personal trips ahead
of time

user discretion in
what to share
online

personal social
media used for
problem solving

senior executives
fired for personal
social media
postings

users avoiding
negative
interactions

personal social
media used for
resume sharing

Senior executives
make a deliberate
choice to not use
social media

personal social
media used to
attract potential
customers

senior executives
need to think about
negative impact of
information shared
on social media

users pay more
attention to their
professional tweets
than personal
tweets
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uses senior
executive personal
details to time an
attack

executive social
media use can
positively impact
company value

personal social
media used to
connect with others

senior executives
set boundaries for
types of
information to be
shared on their
social media
accounts

executive social
media use provides
intel for use in an
attack

personal social
media used to
Identify current
trends

Senior executives
should avoid
disclosing personal
trips ahead of time

executives not
allowed to express
personal opinions
on social media
executives required
to take media
training before
speaking to the
public

personal social
media used to
monitor children's
activity

Senior executives
should avoid
disclosing work
trips ahead of time
shared company
specifics used in
social engineering
attack (Glassdoor,
etc.)

personal social
media used to share
Information

hard to distinguish
between personal
and work-related
achievements

personal social
media used to share
resume

sharing job postings
via social media
accounts

have staff post on
behalf of senior
executives in
personal accounts

policy prohibits
employees from
discussing company
via social media

size of organization
as factor in nature
of response to
negative social
media interactions

Hired by competing
organization to
target them

Prior job
description

social media
contacts causing
work disruption
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value from social
media use depends
on if company is
private or public

what value do they
place on the
organization
which personal
social media
platforms are used
younger generation
social media
overuse

Appendix E

Illustrative supporting data for overarching dimensions
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Overarching
Dimensions
Loss of
Intellectual
Property or
Sensitive Data

Themes

Situational
Awareness

Blackmail

Concepts

• ‘We talk about we want to share pictures
and share how great and wonderful it is to
work there, but we also want to be very
aware of the surroundings when we take
pictures, of what we post that someone
might be able to see…’
• ‘I've seen some folks tweet some pictures
of their network diagrams’
• ‘I’ve seen some folks… accidentally
putting credentials up on Facebook’
• ‘And, he had their YouTube credentials on
a sticky note, on his monitor’
• ‘…but now it happens a lot on Twitter too,
and I've seen organizations post passwords’
• ‘[Executives]… be very aware of the
surroundings when we take pictures, of what
we post that someone might be able to see
pseudocode in the background’
• 'The business is higher profile, more prone
to any sort of blackmail, ransom, anything
like that, and my belief is that they've got to
be a little bit more careful about what they
post, how it's posted, when it's posted, and
things like that'
• ‘what happens in their private lives could
certainly be used to gain leverage over them
in a business capacity, so blackmailing them
for ...’
• ‘I could easily see it as a future possibility
that an executive could post something
either without realizing its importance or
accidently posting something that could be
used as blackmail against them.’
• ‘Executive being blackmailed as a result of
something they post is real. Jeff Bezos is a
prominent example of this.’
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• ‘It’s more likely to occur when execs use a
social media platform to privately message
and disclose things they shouldn’t or behave
in a manner that puts that individual in a
compromising position either morally or
ethically.’
• ‘Let's just say that they are very active, and
things that are done within social media that
are not necessarily, you know, ethical in the
sense of like what happens in their private
lives could certainly be used to gain leverage
over them in a business capacity, so
blackmailing them for ... You know, if they
access pictures, or something along those
lines, because the potential damage for that
kind of information and getting it out to the
public has its damages to the company, as
well.’
Compliance
Violations

HIPAA violations

SEC violations

• ‘Imagine an executive tweets something to
the tune of "we're so good at what we do,
Beyonce chose our hospital for her
healthcare". Unless this was very clearly
approved by Beyonce, this is a HIPAA
violation at minimum.’
• ‘One could even argue that executive's
[sic] shouldn't even know about the
individual patients because they aren't
directly involved in patient care.’
• ‘The funny thing [when thinking about
HIPAA violations] about inference is that
you never know what seemingly innocent
piece of information is harmful.’
• ‘Certainly, you could see a health care exec
talking about a patient, naming a name…’
• ‘I would envision the possibility that
executives may get overly excited about big
“deals” or huge “issues” with customers and
tweet or post in instagram about things that
would violate SEC. this may fall under
“manipulating market prices” or “insider
trading” by sharing too much or confidential
information with followers who in turn react
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to this with information with buying/selling
stocks based on the post.’

• ‘Elon Musk is a great example of that
where he gets himself in trouble all the time
by talking about things that aren't the way
the SEC wants him to release that
information.’
• ‘[For publicly traded organizations] there’s
a lot of rules around what you can say that is
material to the business and how that is
disseminated, so they've got to be very
careful. I think that, that from a financial risk
perspective, that could cause fines and loss
of business, and potential, other legal lawsuit
issues if they aren't careful about what and
how they say things that are material to the
business.’
• ‘Publicly traded companies have to be very
careful because obviously C-level people,
many of them are on the board of directors
and they are privy to information that's not
necessarily for public consumption, and if it
gets out there aside from the normal
channels where the stockholders are
informed about these decisions, about these
things, it could impact the stock price.’

Harm to
Reputation

Public Scandal

• ‘It has ended people's careers. Do you
support... Who was it? The gentleman that
was a part of Mozilla. Was there... The CEO
at the time? Who supported... who tweeted
that he was not in favor of some boycott
against some company. I don't want to say it
was Chick-fil-A. It was something like that,
where he expressed support for some
organization, and he was labeled a bigot, and
all sorts of things. And he got run out of his
own company. I think it was Mozilla…’
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• ‘We've seen it go well, and we've seen it
go horrifically wrong. The guy who shot the
rhino, right? The founder of Jimmy John's
posed with big game, and it went on his
Facebook, and it went viral, and the
company damn near went bankrupt because
people were, you know, like, "The guy's a
horrible human being."’
• ‘Your personal profile is really not, right?
You always can be tied back to the company
that you represent, especially if the bigger
company you work for... You know, the
bigger, the bigger the problem.’
• ‘I think you can do whatever you want to
do; you just have to be careful and set some
boundaries with how you're going to use that
media to influence, right? So you don't want
your personal life too much influencing the
business life so-to-speak, if that makes any
sense’

Negative Social
Media incident

• ‘"Well, that must mean clearly, we think
that's what the company says." I'm like,
"Wait a second. Time out. This is on my
own time. And they're like, "Yeah, but you
don't get to do that." And so that was a harsh
realization, I think, for me is that there is no
off time.’
• ‘Person went on vacation talked about the
bad experiences they had at this resort.
Turns out, that that resort was one of their
biggest clients and that resulted in some
interesting conversations.’
• ‘You had somebody talk about a bad
experience at a hospital, turns out their
company sells software to the hospital. And,
they were talking about that on their
personal Facebook account, except they
didn't really have good privacy settings on
that. And, some of the people that are friends
with were actually at the hospital too so, it
became interesting.’

Fraudulent
Transaction Loss
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C-level Employee
impersonation

Vendor
impersonation

• ‘…if they know a senior executive is going
to be, perhaps, out of comms for a weekend,
maybe that's a good time to start spoofing
them, because they know that the real person
can’t be reached…’
• ‘If you say, hey, I'm going to Cancun for
the weekend, and then the bad actor starts
emailing the CFO saying, hey, I'm stuck in
Cancun, but I need you to transfer this
money. That now is a more credible email
and that doesn't help the organization defend
itself.’
• ‘[Executives] have to be careful about
putting too much of their personal
information out there because it may be the
piece of the puzzle that someone malicious
might need to be able to penetrate the
organization through an email not against
them personally necessarily, but against their
assistant or against someone that works for
them.’
• ‘[Penetration testers] have typically
created, very, very precise attacks that have
penetrated the network, and that was
because people gave too much information.’
• ‘For example if a chief marketing officer
just posted hey, I'm going to be in Bahamas
next week, I know the location. Now, I
know that that person is out of office and I
can use that information for let's say, social
engineering…’

• ‘Let's say the CFO's on vacation. The
secretary or the office manager for the
finance department has some bills to pay.
Suddenly somebody calls up and, "Hey. This
is an urgent bill. If you don't pay this bill
today, by X time, we're going to turn the
lights out, or we're going to turn your
internet connection off." Whatever that
scenario is, and she can't get in touch or he
can't get in touch with the CFO, suddenly
now you've got people pressured to make a
decision for the benefit of the company
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without the oversight, and they were able to
be socially engineered because somebody
got that information off of a public social
media site…’

• ‘…the company gets a random invoice
from a person saying, "Hey, so and so said
to go ahead and pay this." That the person
who sends the email, and the invoice, knows
that the executive is on a plane or
somewhere, that they are just not reachable,
and the company doesn't do their checks and
balances, and pays a fraudulent invoice…’
• ‘They're finding those kind of things online
and then … embezzling your money from
your accounts in ways that they have
convinced other people to do it.’
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